The Good
That at which all things aim — for Plato a transcendent Form lighting up all reality, for Aristotle the goal that completes a human life.
The Good (to agathon) is the supreme object of value and the ultimate aim of action. Plato (4th c. BCE) made the Form of the Good the highest of all Forms — the source of being and intelligibility, likened in the Republic to the sun. Aristotle rejected any single transcendent Good in favor of the human good, eudaimonia, achieved through virtuous activity. The contrast between a transcendent Good and a this-worldly human good runs through all later philosophy and theology.
How it traveled
- RepublicAthens · -375explains
- LawsAthens · -348explains
- GorgiasAthens · -348redefines
- RhetoricChalcis · -335explains
- Nicomachean EthicsChalcis · -322explains
- Eudemian EthicsChalcis · -322explains
- de Finibus Bonorum et MalorumFormiae · -43explains
- DiscoursesNicopolis · 108redefines
- Ad Se IpsumVindobona (Vienna) · 170explains
- DeipnosophistaeNaucratis · 230explains
- Vitae philosophorum— · 240explains
- EnneadesRome · 270explains
- Midrash Tanchuma BuberTiberias · 600
- Duties of the HeartZaragoza (Saragossa) · 1080
- Guide for the PerplexedCairo · 1190
- Yalkut Shimoni on NachTiberias · 1250
- Yalkut Shimoni on TorahTiberias · 1250
- Sha'arei OrahGuadalajara · 1260
- ZoharGuadalajara · 1280
- Zohar ChadashGuadalajara · 1290
- Sefer HaIkkarimSoria · 1425
- Akeidat YitzchakTarragona · 1490synthesis
- Abarbanel on TorahNaples · 1505
- Avodat HaKodesh (Ibn Gabbai)Cairo · 1523
- Ketem Paz on ZoharTzfat · 1561
- Reshit ChokhmahTzfat · 1575
- Ohr HaChammah on ZoharTzfat · 1620
- Mikdash Melekh, RaMaZ Commentary on ZoharTzfat · 1680
- Likutei MoharanBreslov (Ukraine) · 1802
- Maor VaShemeshKrakow (Cracow) · 1817
- Sha'arei AvodahStrashelye · 1820
- Likutei HalakhotBreslov (Ukraine) · 1840
- Malbim on ProverbsBucharest · 1860
- Malbim on PsalmsBucharest · 1860
- Malbim on IsaiahBucharest · 1860
- Epistulae—redefines
- Fragmenta MoraliaAthensexplains
- Historia RomanaRomeexplains
- Legum Allegoriarum Libri I-III—explains
- De Specialibus Legibus (lib. i‑iv)—explains
Key passages(20)
*תוכן כוונתו, כי בני אדם יתחלקו לשתי מחלקות, האחת אשר כל אנשיה יכונו בפעולותיהם להשיג תכלית ידוע אשר יבחרו להם, והם מתפרדים לג' ראשים. הראש האחד יפנה רק אל הטוב המוחלט והאמיתי הנרצה בעיני ה'. ואנשיי מ
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והנה להיות הענין כאשר נתישב. מהיות הכרת התכלית והתועלת בפעולות הכרחי לשיתנועע האדם אליהם. היה מהשתדלות החוקר לתקור על מהות האושר ולשבח ענינו ולפרסמו לשומו לנס נכר ומבואר לכל. יראו רבים וישתדלו בכל עוז
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*תוכן דעתו הוא כי ב' מיני הצלחות יש לאדם, הא' הצלחה מוסרית הנקראת בל"הק "דבוק בה" כמא"הכ "ואתם הדבקים בה'" וכו' והב' הצלחה גופנית, ולזה יצטרכו שלש ענינים, הא' הוא בעצמותו של אדם ר"ל בריאות גופו וכוחות
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Liber de philosophorum sectis (epitome ap. Stobaeum) · Arius Didymus
Liber de philosophorum sectis (epitome ap. Stobaeum) · Arius Didymus
Ἠθικὰ προβλήματα [Sp.] · Alexander of Aphrodisias
Ἠθικὰ προβλήματα [Sp.] · Alexander of Aphrodisias
In Porphyrii Isagogen Sive Quinque Voces · Ammonius
In Aristotelis artem rhetoricam commentarium · Anonymi in Aristotelis Artem Rhetoricam
Divisiones Aristoteleae · Pseudo-Aristotle
Divisiones Aristoteleae · Pseudo-Aristotle
Divisiones Aristoteleae · Pseudo-Aristotle
Divisiones Aristoteleae · Pseudo-Aristotle
But good has many meanings, and there is a part of it that is beautiful, and one form of it is practicable but another is not. The sort of good that is practicable is that which is an object aimed at,
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Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good: hence it has been well said that the Good is That at which all things aim.
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Men of refinement, on the other hand, and men of action think that the Good is honor—for this may be said to be the end of the Life of Politics. But honor after all seems too superficial to be the Goo
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But in what sense then are different things called good? For they do not seem to be a case of things that bear the same name merely by chance. Possibly things are called good in virtue of being derive
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If therefore neither of these views is satisfactory, perhaps we should say that what is wished for in the true and unqualified sense is the good, but that what appears good to each person is wished fo
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Let us assume good to be whatever is desirable for its own sake, or for the sake of which we choose something else; that which is the aim of all things, or of all things that possess sensation or reas
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